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1 INTRODUCTION
An issue which has attracted considerable attention
in the study of agrarian structure and transforma-
lion is the phenomenon of 'interlinked' markets.
Amit Bhaduri's (1973) paper is an important early
effort at analysing interlinkage as a possible expla-
nation for stagnation in Indian agriculture. An
important feature of Bhaduri's agrarian economy is
the prevalence in it of crop-share tenancy arrange-
ments. In this setting, the landlord is seen as trans-
acting with the peasant-tenant by combining within
himself the role of both rentier and money-lender
(the land-lease and credit markets are 'interlinked').
As a rentier who leases out his land, the landlord
claims a share of the produce raised by the tenant;
and as a money-lender who offers consumption
loans to the tenant, he extracts usurious income by
way of charging very high rates of interest on the
credit advanced. Yield- improving technological
innovation undertaken by the landlord will, given a
fixed rental share, raise the tenant's income. This
could reduce the latter's dependence on the land-
lord's credit for his consumption requirements, and
so eat into the landlord's usury income - to an extent
where the landlord's gain from the land-lease mar-
ket could be swamped by his loss on the credit
market. Whence a theory of stagnation predicated
on interlinkage.
Bhaduri's explanation of stagnation has been criti-
cized for relying on an inconsistent use of the notion
of power. Specifically, if the landlord, in the first
instance, is seen as having the power to raise the
interest rate or the rental share in order to prevent the
tenant from wriggling out of his debt-trap through
(say) a voluntary one-period reduction in his con-
sumption, then why cannot he (the landlord) exer-
cise power over the same levers in order to extract
the entire benefit from yield-improving technologi-
cal innovation? (Griffin 1974). Quite apart from this
theoretical difficulty, there is empirical evidence - as
in the surveys undertaken in Eastern India by Pranab
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Bardhan and Ashok Rudra (1978) and in Bangladesh
by Atiqur Rehman (1979) - to suggest that, contrary
to Bhaduri's hypothesis, the behaviour of landlords
is fully compatible with an interest on their part in
raising productivity through innovation. Briefly, it
would appear that Bhaduri's model of interlinkage
provides important insights into the mechanisms for
perpetuating backward agrarian relations, but serves
the thesis of technological stagnation rather poorly.
This last point of view furnishes the motivation for
the present article. It will be my concern to argue that
interlinkage is not in any sense an exclusive charac-
teristic of a backward, or static, agrarian economy.
To the contrary interlinkage can be an integral fea-
ture of a dynamic regime: one in which tenancy
cultivation has given place to owner cultivation as
the predominant prevailing tenurial mode; in which
traditional methods of irrigation have given place to
modern methods; in which farming practices are
governed by systematic technological upgrading, as
manifested in the increasingly wide use of high
yielding varieties of seeds and chemical inputs; in
which credit requirements of agents are available to
meet not only their consumption needs but also their
production needs; and in which traditional foci of
power, such as landlords, have yielded place to
other powerful agents, such as traders who are in a
position to offer credit, and water-sellers who have
crucial control over the immensely important re-
source of private irrigation. In many ways, the
agrarian regime I shall be describing is one charac-
terized by emerging forces of capitalist develop-
ment; and while the agents involved in exploitation
- at both the dispensing and the receiving ends - may
be different from those in Bhaduri's semi-feudal
setting, it will be observed that the instrument of
interlinkage has an important role to play in estab-
lishing social relations of oppression and depend-
ence which bear a strong family resemblance to
those which obtain in Bhaduri's model.
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The issues outlined above are in this article studied
in the concrete context of Sirunavalpattu Village of
North Arcot District in Tamil Nadu. What is re-
ported in this article are some major findings of a
survey conducted in 1982-83 by the present author,
and dealt with extensively in his doctoral disserta-
tion (Janakarajan 1986). Particular emphasis is placed
on changes in the extent and nature of irrigation
available for cultivation, and on other resultant struc-
tural transformations. A central theme of this article
has to do with the polarization of agents deriving
from their differential access to the crucial resource
of groundwater. A market for groundwater has
emerged which forms one component of an inte-
grated interlinkage of the credit, product, water and
labour markets involving three main agents in
interlinked transactions: the trader, the water-seller
and the water-purchaser. This paper describes this
interlinkage in the context of Sirunavalpattu village,
analyses the triadic power relations that it embodies
and demonstrates how this pattern of interlocking
markets, which is socially exploitative, has emerged
as an integral part of a dynamic agrarian regime
characterised by rapid technical and institutional
change.
2 A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF
SIRUNAVALPATU VILLAGE
Agriculture is the mainstay of the village in as much
as more than four-fifths of the households (263 out
of 298) derive their income either by engaging them-
selves directly in cultivation, or by way of leasing-in
or leasing-out activities, or by way of hiring them-
selves out as agricultural labourers.
Of primary interest in the present context is the
system of irrigation that obtains in the village. The
traditional form of irrigation has been surface irriga-
tion, constituted by tanks and spring channels. The
capacity of the tanks - in terms of the duration for
which water is available - has become greatly cur-
tailed in recent times owing to the effects of long-
term siltation. In fact, the area irrigated by tanks at
the time of survey was virtually nil. For the most
part, the tank water is now used virtually only for
washing cattle, and that too during the monsoon
months. A spring channel, fed by the Palaru river,
still irrigates a few plots of land. Under the circum-
stances, it is not surprising that the traditional irriga-
tion institutions - based on community participa-
tion, and responsible for the maintenance of the
tanks and the regulation and distribution of water -
are now practically defunct.
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The decay of the traditional system of surface irriga-
tion has been accompanied by the growth of
groundwater irrigation on a massive scale, not only
on punjai (registered dry land) but on nanjai (regis-
tered wet land) as well. While the origin of sub-
surface irrigation in the village dates back to the
1940s when irrigation wells were first dug, it was
only after the introduction of high-yielding varie-
ties, sometime around the mid 1960s, that invest-
ment in wells and pumpsets began to take place on
a large scale. The high-yielding varieties were an
inducement to the farmers to attempt to raise three
crops in a year; and pumpset irrigation penetrated
for the first time into the registered wet lands. With
the introduction of the new technology in agricul-
ture (a package of assured, controlled lift irrigation
and high yielding varieties), the crop pattern in the
village, on both nanjai and punjai, was radically
transformed. Over time, monocropping became the
rule in the village, with paddy being grown on most
plots of land. At the time of the survey (1982-83), the
irrigation regime in Sirunavalpattu has undergone
such drastic changes that wells accounted for nearly
82 per cent (400 acres) of net area under irrigation -
the balance 18 per cent being accounted for by the
spring channel (84 acres); tanks had virtually no
place in the irrigation system of the village.
The tremendous changes that have been witnessed
on the irrigation front in the village have been ac-
companied by transformations in other aspects of
the agrarian structure - transformations attending
the passage of the village from a traditional to a
modern regime. First, there have been important
changes to the pattern of land ownership. There
have been very substantial land transfers from the
erstwhile landlords - Brahmins and other upper
caste Hindus - to the Naicker households of the
village. The Naickers, (a traditional labouring caste
largely concentrated in the northern part of Tamil
Nadu), increased their share of land from a little
more than 40 per cent in the mid-sixties to 82 per cent
by the time of the survey. The shift in the pattern of
land ownership also witnessed a sharp change in the
dominant mode of tenurial arrangement, from ten-
ancy to owner cultivation. The proportion of land
under tenancy decreased from about 50 per cent in
the mid 1960s to as little as 10 per cent by 1982-83.
The erstwhile tenants (Naickers) opted for cultiva-
tion in favour of leasing-out operations when land
entered their possession.
Very considerable changes have also occurred in the
level of adoption of modern technology in cultiva-
tion. This is reflected in the widely-prevalent use of
HYV seeds, chemical inputs, and modern agricul-
tural implements, and in the exploitation of techno-
logically superior methods for the lifting of
groundwater and its conveyance via channels to the
fields.
An immediate implication of the irrigation-led adop-
tion of modern practices of cultivation, with its
emphasis on the use of more advanced technology
and complementary inputs, is that i. enhances the
liquidity needs of the farmers, and their need for the
timely availability of credit. In this dynamic setting,
the demand for credit for production - and not only
for consumption - requirements already marks a
departure from the static setting of Bhaduri's model.
Further, the agrarian regime under review is no
longer one in which a single agent - as is the case with
Bhaduri's landlord - combines within himself mul-
tiplex roles. To the contrary, functions are more
specialized, and with the fading away of traditional
landlordism in favour of the emergence of a class of
entrepreneurial big farmers whose dominant inter-
est resides in the consolidation of their holdings and
in the investment of surpluses into yield-improving
cultivation, conditions are favourable for an easy
passage of external finance, managed by traders,
into the village to meet its credit requirements.
Access to water plays a crucial role in the dynamics
of such a situation; as a source of market and
nonmarket power within the economy, and as a
contributing factor to the manner in which transac-
tions become interlocked. It is important to consider
the extent and implications of the differential access
to groundwater which is a concomitant of the trans-
formation in the irrigation regime.
Access to groundwater in the village is lopsided. Of
the 227 cultivator households (excluding 14 house-
holds which were hard to classify) in Sirunavalpattu
village at the time of the survey, 71 households
owned wells and 156 did not. These two groups of
households will hereafter be referred to as the WW
('with well') and the NW ('no well') group respec-
tively. Among the WW group of farmers, wells are
more intensively concentrated in the larger hold-
ings: on average, households with holdings of less
than five acres own one well, while households with
holdings in excess of five acres own 1.8 wells.
in the NW group own only 21.3 per cent of the total
area of wet lands and 35.5 per cent of the total area
of dry lands. The average landholding (wet and dry
together) for the WW group (7.38 acres) is nearly five
times that for the NW group (under 1.5 acres). The
extent of inequality in the distribution of land across
all 229 cultivator households is extraordinarily high,
with a Gini coefficient of 0.88. What is remarkable is
that Gini coefficients calculated separately for the
NW and the WW groups of farmers, are relatively
small - 0.34 and 0.40 respectively. These figures
suggest that the 'between group' component of in-
equality is far greater than the 'within group' com-
ponent.
Inter-group differentials are very pronounced in the
matter of the quality as well as the extent of land
owned. If we treat the value of land as a proxy for its
quality, survey data clearly indicated that (i) the best
land is concentrated in the hands of the larger WW
farmers; and (ii) in general, the quality of land
owned by the WW category of farmers is superior to
that owned by the NW category. Evidencè of the
vastly superior socioeconomic status of the WW
group of cultivators groups receives additional sup-
port from data on the pattern of ownership of all
assets (agricultural and nonagricultural) for the two
groups. The average value of assets owned by a WW
household, at RS.269,000, is over nine-and-a-half
times the average value of assets, at RS.27,500, owned
by an NW household; further, the 31 per cent of
cultivator households constituting the WW group
have a claim on 82 per cent of the total value of all
assets.
The concentration of access to water (in the form of
lift irrigation) thus confers tremendous differential
advantages on the WW group of farmers vis-a-vis the
NW group. Given both the importance and the
relative scarcity of this resource in the scheme of the
villages agrarian economy, the emergence of a mar-
ket for water was almost inevitable. Equally inevita-
ble, in view of the control over productive resources
that goes hand-in-hand with the control over water,
is the prospect of a market that favours the seller.
Features of this market, as it has developed in
Sirunavalpattu village, are described in the next
section.
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3 THE MARKET FOR WATER IN
This lopsidedness is reflected also in the pattern of SIRUNAVALPA1TLJ VILLAGE
ownership of land and other assets. The survey The practice of the sale and purchase of water in the
reveals that the 68.7 per cent of cultivator households survey village dates back, as far as can be ascer-
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tamed, to 1958 when a few oil engines were installed
by some rich Mudaliar landlords on the registered
dry lands of the village. Sale of groundwater ex-
tracted from registered wet land also began to be-
come a common practice with the growth in the
numbers of electrified pumpsets installed to lift
water from wet-land tracts. An essential feature of
the terms and conditions under which water is sold
is that the purchaser will transfer a fixed proportion
of the produce raised on his farm to the seller. This
payment is referred to as water rent. The share of
produce, on both wet and dry land has displayed a
remarkable constancy, over time, at the figure of
one-third. Prior to the introduction of lift-irrigation
in the village, and when the tank was the main
source of irrigation, the convention was to recognize
only two claimants to the produce raised on any plot
of land: the owner of the land and its cultivator (both
of whom could, of course, be subsumed in a single
agent). The norm was that 50 per cent of the produce
would go to the landowner and 50 per cent to the
cultivator.
With the emergence of lift irrigation as a resource,
like land, in which a private property right was
vested, the convention was introduced of recogniz-
ing three claimants to the produce raised on any plot
of land: the landowner, the owner of water, and the
cultivator. The norm now was that each claimant
was entitled to a share equalling a third of the
produce raised on the plot of land. Some possible
configurations of claimants and agents that could, in
principle, obtain are listed below:
a the three claimants could all be constituted by a
single agent who controls both the land and the
water resources, and also engages in cultivation
of his own land;
b each of the three claimants could be a distinct
agent;
c the three claimants could be constituted by two
agents of whom one only owns land which is
leased in for cultivation by the other agent, using
the latter's own water;
d the three claimants could be constituted by two
agents of whom one owns land and cultivates it
after purchasing water from the other agent; and
e the three claimants could be constituted by two
agents of whom one owns both land and water
which are respectively leased out and sold to the
other agent who does the cultivation.
ids bulletin vol 24 no 3 1993
78
In Sirunavalpattu village, category (a) in the list
above is comprised mainly by a set of small land-
owners belonging to the WW group of farmers;
category (b) does not obtain in the village; category
(c) corresponds to a case of ordinary land-lease and
tenancy; and categories (d) and (e) are the ones
which involve bilateral transactions in the sale and
purchase of water, and in which we are primarily
interested.
I shall restrict myself to a consideration of category
(d), which is the most widely observed configura-
tion in Sirunavalpattu village. In view of the tremen-
dous groundwater resource-gap between the WW
and the NW groups of farmers, it is not surprising
that, with some minor exceptions, the two parties to
the transactions in water are usually distinct subsets
drawn from the WW group (the water-sellers) and
the NW group (the water-purchasers). Survey data
for the year 1982-83 indicates that over 72 per cent of
the NW households were purchasers of water. Area
under paddy accounted for the largest share of land
(84 per cent) for which water was purchased. A
considerable transfer of output from the NW group
of farmers to the WW group has been a concomitant
of the transactions in water. Survey results indicate
that a little less than ten per cent of the total receipts
of produce by the WW group of farmers is through
sale of water, and about eight per cent of the quantity
of output marketed by the WW group of farmers is
accounted for by output received from water-pur-
chasers.
Just how favourable the market for water is to those
who have control of groundwater resources be-
comes clear from a more detailed consideration of
the terms and condition under which water is sold,
and of which the water rent is only one component.
In addition to the customary payment of a third of
the produce raised on his land, the water-purchaser
is also required to perform certain unpaid or under-
paid labour services for the water-seller. Some at
least of the free services are the following. To begin
with, the purchaser is required to exercise vigil in the
water-seller's motor-shed so that he is in a state of
readiness to switch on the motor from the moment
that power is supplied. He must then irrigate the
seller's land and his own, in that order. He is further
required to clear the field channels that convey water
from the well to the seller's fields; to assist in lifting
the motor and pump from the well in the event of
repairs to the pumpset; and, above all, to protect the
seller's crops from grazing cattle. The water-pur-
chaser is also required to be on call to perform a
variety of other paid services, which include uproot-
ing seedlings, ploughing, and manuring. While the
purchaser is generally paid wages at the prevailing
rates for these operations - although a few cases of
underpayment have also been reported - he is in no
position to decline the seller's demands on his time
and labour. For the most part, the water-purchaser
is tied to the seller's farm and motor-shed till the
harvest is over. This interlinkage of water and
labour markets parallels the tie-up between land-
lease and labour markets which one frequently en-
counters in situations of traditional landlordism.
A particularly potent source of the control which a
water-seller can exercise over a water-purchaser
resides in the fact that the former is in a position to
cease supplying water to the latter at a crucial stage
of crop-raising, on alleged grounds of his pumpset
being in a state of disrepair, or some such similarly
flimsy excuse. Such a cessation of the provision of
water could expose the water-purchaser, who by
this time would have invested substantially in rais-
ing his crop, to the danger of heavy losses. Neither
is the purchaser free to turn to an alternative supplier
of water: a customary practice in force in the village
ensures that a water-seller may supply water only to
owners of contiguous plots; and this practice is
easily enforced by an interested water-seller's denial
of conveyance, through his own field, of water from
some other potential supplier. Under these condi-
tions, a water-purchaser often has no recourse but to
accept an exploitative contract from the seller - a
contract which ties up the water and labour markets
in a way which fully capitalizes on the seller's supe-
rior bargaining strength.
In addition, the often object dependence of cultiva-
tors who have no access to private lift irrigation
facilities on those who do, is also a potential source
of the very considerable control which the latter can
come to acquire over the land-lease and land mar-
kets. The means to this control against reside in the
water-seller's ability to exercise his caprice in switch-
ing off supply of water to the purchaser at a critical
stage of crop-raising on the purchaser's farm. Under
these circumstances, the water-purchaser can be
driven to incur heavy losses on the investment al-
ready undertaken in the expectation of an uninter-
rupted supply of water from the seller. If the pur-
chaser's investment has been financed by borrow-
ing, he could find himself in a state of hopeless
indebtedness; and to redeem himself from such a
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situation he may have no option but to lease out his
land (unusually on unfavourable terms) to the wa-
ter-seller, or to effect a distress sale of his land. (For
a similar pattern of such 'reverse tenancy' in Gujarat,
see Shah and Raju 1986). For example, in a detailed
sample survey of 51 cultivator households belong-
ing to the NW category, it was found that, in the two
years preceding the time of the survey (1982-83), five
farmers had sold their land under pressure from
WW farmers from whom they had purchased water,
while two farmers had sold their land due to non-
availability of potential water suppliers. All of these
seven NW farmers were small landholders, owning
less than two acres of land each. Six of the seven
farmers subsequently purchased land elsewhere in
the village. However, since these were all cases of
distress sale, the price obtained by the farmers for
their land was relatively poor; and after paying off
their debts from their sale proceeds, the amount left
over was sufficient only to permit purchase of land
that was both of inferior quality and smaller in extent
that their previous holdings. Processes such as
these, which link control over water with the func-
tioning of the land market, thus contribute both to
the impoverishment of the NW group of farmers
and to the consolidation of the holdings of the WW
group.
Another condition of sale of water relates to the
market sale of the water-purchaser's output. Water-
purchasers are often directed by water-sellers to sell
their produce to a particular trader with whom the
sellers have entered into a prior relationship in the
credit market. The credit market, and the manner in
which it is interlinked with the product market,
however requires extensive treatment and will be
dealt with in the following section.
4 THE CREDIT AND PRODUCT MARKETS:
INTERLINKAGES AND TRIANGULAR
TRANSACTIONS
An important consequence of the prolific growth of
lift irrigation - in conjunction with the development
of HYV technology, mechanization in farming, and
the extensive use of complementary inputs in culti-
vation - has been to afford a strong incentive, par-
ticularly among those cultivators with access to
private lift irrigation facilities, to organize produc-
tion on a large scale. Sustaining a large production
base inevitably generates a considerable demand for
liquid balances in order to meet the expenditures
associated with agricultural operations in a regime
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of relatively modernized cultivation practices. Since
concentration in ownership of land is linked with
concentration in ownership of groundwater re-
sources, the scale of production is likely to be much
larger among cultivators who have access to private
lift irrigation facilities. Partly as a consequence of
this, and partly because of irrigation-related ex-
penses, it is to be expected that the demand for liquid
balances should be particularly large among such
cultivators. The development of a market for credit
required to finance production activities would also
appear to be inevitable; and one might expect to find
that cultivators who have control of private
groundwater resource will constitute the single larg-
est component of the demand side of the credit
market. To what extent does the experience of
Sirunavalpattu village bear out these hypotheses?
First, it should be noted that there is no such thing as
a single credit market in the village. There are
several sources of credit available to the residents of
the village, and these sources can be broadly catego-
rized into institutional and non-institutional. The
institutional source of credit is constituted by a
Cooperative Society, a Commercial Bank, and a
Land Development Bank. The principal non-institu-
tional sources of credit include landlords, money-
lenders/pawnbrokers, relatives and friends, and
traders. Survey data on sample of 51 WW and 51
NW households indicated the dominance of the
socioeconomic status of the WW farmers vis-a-vis
the NW farmers, as reflected in the perceived supe-
rior creditworthiness of the former group. For every
source of credit (save landlords who are a source of
less than 2 per cent of the total value of loans
outstanding), the WW farmers accounted for a con-
siderably larger proportion of the value of loans
outstanding than the NW farmers. The quantum of
institutional credit is quite sizable, but it has been
availed of, by and large, by a relatively small number
of wealthy landowners; and the credit generally has
been employed to finance investment in assets such
as milch animals, pipe-line installations and power
tillers. Moneylenders and pawnbrokers advance
money for a number of purposes, as do friends and
relatives (who constitute the single largest source of
credit in the village): for digging new wells, deepen-
ing existing wells, repaying old debts, performing
marriages, and so on. The main source of credit for
the financing of working capital requirements in
agricultural production is constituted by traders:
this is an important source of (nearly 22 per cent of)
the total value of loans outstanding, and is oriented
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almost entirely to financing the costs of cultivation of
the WW group of farmers. It is the transactions in the
credit and product markets between traders and
WW farmers that are of primary interest to us;
accordingly, all future references to the credit mar-
ket will be to the credit provided by traders.
The term 'traders' is a generic one which, in the
context of Sirunavalpattu village, refers specifically
to a set of six commission agencies (mandis) which
operate from nearby towns, and to a local paddy
broker (hereafter LPB) who operates from within the
village. The money-lending activities of mandis
evolved initially as a set of restricted, personalized
transactions with a few farmers who were close to
the mandi owners; but given the increasing pressure
on the demand for loans to finance cultivation, mandi
owners quickly recognized the advantages of an
extensive tying-up of the credit market with their
own grain trade. The profitability of this tie-up is
exemplified by the meteoric ascent of the LPB in
Sirunavalpattu village: from a mere bullock-cart
hirer to an independent trader and source of credit.
While traders have been known to offer credit for
unproductive purposes (marriages, village functions,
medical expenses, even liquor-consumption), their
main emphasis is on lending for productive ends.
The principal purposes for which traders advance
loans to farmers are to finance the purchase of
fertilizers and pesticides, new pumpsets and motor
spares, and to meet the costs of replacing motor coils,
deepening wells, and paying the electricity tariff.
An essential feature of the transactions between
traders and farmers is the manner in which the credit
and product markets are interlocked. Loans are
advanced in seemingly 'liberal' terms by the traders,
but large implicit interest payments are extracted by
purchasing the farmers' output cheap and selling it
dear to the hulling merchants in the towns. Thus, the
most important conditionality of a loan advanced by
a trader to a farmer is that the latter should sell his
produce only to the trader who has lent him money.
In fact, an indebted farmers is expected to sell his
entire product - and not just the amount that will
cover the value of the loan he has borrowed - to the
trader. So complete is the command of the LPB and
mandi-owners over the marketed output of farmers
in the village, that the regulated markets in the
nearby towns of Kanceepuram and Arcot are thor-
oughly inactive. When this author approached a
clerk at the Kanceepuram regulated market for data
on agricultural output sold through the market com-
mittee, the clerk replied that no produce had been
sold through the market. Interest is not explicitly
charged on the loan advanced, except in the event of
default in repayment when this is accompanied by
default in selling output only to the concerned trader,
in which case interest is charged at the rate of 24 per
cent per annum. A farmer who displays consistency
in selling his output to the trader he has borrowed
from is often deflected from settling his debts: the
trader is reluctant to lose his hold on a steady source
of cheap output.
A variety of mechanisms are deployed for purchas-
ing output cheap from the farmer. First, a commis-
sion of 2 per cent on the value of sales is charged by
the trader who serves as a middleman between the
farmers on the one hand and the hulling merchant
and millers on the other. Second, a trader often
resorts to false weighing as a means to undervalu-
ing the output purchased from the farmer: at a
conservative estimate, 2 kilograms per bag of paddy
are accounted for by underweighing. Third, a de-
duction is effected towards wages payable by the
trader to labourers who weigh paddy in the mandi:
the customary deduction is half a kilogram per bag
of paddy. Fourth, a deduction of one kilogram per
bag is made as an allowance towards dirt and rot in
the paddy marketed. This deduction is mandatory,
and is allowed for even if the paddy happens to be
unmixed with dirt; if there is evidence of dirt, two or
even three kilograms of paddy per bag may be
deducted. Finally, there is resort to direct
underpricing whereby the trader understates to the
farmer the price available from the hulling mer-
chant, and pockets the margin between the purchase
price and the sale price: this is locally referred to as
'undercover trade'. In addition the trader frequently
avails himself of a credit cycle by deferring payment
for produce (on which he pays no interest) to the
farmer.
A final aspect of the bilateral transactions between
traders and WW farmers that must be mentioned is
that these bilateral transactions are often transformed
into trilateral transactions which involuntarily in-
volve NW farmers as well. This is as instance of the
sort of 'triadic' power relations which mediate the
interlocking of markets in agrarian settings, and
which have been extensively dealt with by Kaushik
Basu (1986). In the specific context of Sirunavalpattu
village, the triadic transaction in question assumes
the following form. Traders are keen to identify
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resource persons (that is, large WW farmers), and to
make credit available to these farmers on very liberal
terms. In exchange, an1 in view of the position of
superior power enjoyed by water-selling WW farm-
ers vis-a-vis water-purchasing NW farmers the 're-
source person' is required to direct those who pur-
chase water from him to sell their produce cheap to
the concerned mandi-owner. The water-purchaser,
who is greatly dependent on the water-seller for an
uninterrupted supply of water, has usually no op-
tion but to comply with this.
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING
OBSERVATIONS
I have, in this article, attempted to trace the passage
of a North Arcot village from a 'traditional', 'stag-
nant' agrarian regime to a 'modern', 'dynamic' one.
At the heart of the processes attending this evolution
has been the prolific growth of lift irrigation in the
village. The importance of groundwater in the
scheme of things is reflected in a clear polarization of
the cultivating households into a small group of
powerful, resource-rich cultivators who have access
to private lift irrigation facilities, and a large group
of relatively deprived cultivators who have no ac-
cess to private sources of irrigation. The interlocking
of markets has been shown to be an integral feature
of an agrarian regime of the type exemplified in
Sirunavalpattu village - one which is subject to rapid
technological modernization accompanied by the
secular displacement of traditional institutions such
as landlordism. The interlocking of markets has
been noted to take place at, as it were, two layers.
The first layer involves the tying-up of the market
for groundwater with the market for labour: culti-
vators with access to groundwater resources exploit
the dependence on themselves of cultivators with-
out such access by selling water in exchange for a
share of the produce raised on the water-purchaser's
farm; in addition, the purchaser is required to per-
form a number of unpaid labour services for the
seller, and also to be on call for performing a number
of paid services. Control over groundwater re-
sources also permits a gradual encroachment of the
spheres of control of resource-rich farmers on the
land and land-lease markets. The transactions be-
tween water-sellers and water-purchasers are often
reflective of the exploitatively superior bargaining
power of sellers vis-a-vis purchasers; and the find-
ings available in this regard from the survey of
Sirunavalpattu village are in stark contrast to the
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purported equity delivered by the operation of
groundwater markets which has been remarked on
by a number of authors including Shah and Raju
(1986), Mandai (1989) and Roth (1985).
The second layer at which interlocking of markets
has been observed, and in which, again, water plays
a central role, relates to the tying-up of the credit
and product markets in transactions between trad-
ers-cum-moneylenders and cultivators with access
to groundwater resources. The increased scale of
cultivation attendant upon the development of pri-
vate lift irrigation facilities and the use of comple-
mentary inputs, together with the large expenses
that have to be incurred on irrigation-related costs,
has resulted in a great pressure on the demand for
liquid balances by cultivators with access to lift
irrigation. The emergence of traders as a potential
source of credit to meet this demand, and the opera-
tion of a credit market that could promote their grain
trade, have been inevitable concomitants of these
developments. An essential feature of the transac-
tions between traders and farmers is that the traders
offer interlinked contracts with a view to wielding
optimal control over the twin levers of the interest-
rate on loans advanced and the price paid by the
traders for the farmers output. A particularly severe
aspect of the terms and conditions under which
credit is offered relates to the involuntary involve-
ment of resource-poor farmers in the transactions
between traders and resource-rich farmers; the power
wielded by water-sellers over water-purchasers is
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